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Abstract 
Bill Clinton and Geraldine Ferraro were accused of “playing the race card” during the 2008 contest 
for the Democratic presidential nomination. This essay explores the different forms race cards may 
assume and the dangers each poses to the public dialogue. Moving away from the traditional focus 
on persuasive effects, the Clinton and Ferraro utterances are analyzed as argumentative discourses. 
Then, critical standards are promulgated for evaluating their reasonableness. 
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On Saturday, January 26, 2008, before his wife’s impending defeat in the South Carolina 
primary, former President Bill Clinton told reporters, “Jesse Jackson won South Carolina 
twice, in ’84 and ’88. And he ran a good campaign. And Senator Obama’s run a good cam-
paign here” (Muir, 2008a ¶. 30). 
On Friday, March 7, 2008, a local Torrance, California, newspaper published an inter-
view with Geraldine Ferraro. “If Obama was a white man,” she was quoted as telling the 
Daily Breeze, “he would not be in this position. And if he was [sic] a woman (of any color) 
he would not be in this position. He happens to be very lucky to be who he is. And the 
country is caught up in the concept” (Farber, 2008, p. 6D). 
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These remarks sparked a firestorm of controversy. Clinton and Ferraro were accused of 
improperly introducing race into the presidential primary contest. In defending them-
selves, each countercharged that it was actually their critics, rather than themselves, who 
were guilty of this ignominious offense. 
In the ensuing coverage, journalists framed their stories around the playing of the “race 
card.” A headline in the New York Times read: “Bill Clinton Irritated by Race-Card Ques-
tions” (Phillips, 2008). Slate declared: “It Should be No Surprise that the Clintons are Play-
ing the Race Card” (Hitchens, 2008). The Seattle Times proclaimed: “Candidates Dealing 
Race Card” (“Candidates,” 2008). U.S. News and World Report used the headline: “Bill Clin-
ton in Race Card Blowup” (“Bill,” 2008). 
Geraldine Ferraro’s words generated similar commentaries. On March 13, Ann Curry 
interviewed Geraldine Ferraro on the Today Show. Curry’s questions focused on whether 
Ferraro or the Obama campaign had played the “race card” (Curry, 2008, March 13). On 
March 14, Kevin Merida (2008) of the Washington Post described the political “landscape” 
as one filled with “charges and countercharges—of insensitivity, racism, race-baiting, race-
carding, sinister calculation and thin-skinnedness” (p. C1). On March 15, Fred Barnes 
(2008), host of Fox News’s Beltway Boys, opened the broadcast by announcing, “The hot 
story tonight is race cards” (¶. 9). 
The card metaphor has been “applied to politics for centuries” (Safire, 1993, p. 106). In 
the Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes (1998) observed, “[T]here is no honour [in] military [com-
mand] but by war, nor any such hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle” 
(p. 66). John Quincy Adams said of Henry Clay, he is “a gamester in politics as well as 
cards” (Oriad, 1991, p. 326). Franklin Roosevelt borrowed the phrase, “new deal,” from 
Mark Twain’s (1889) Connecticut Yankee. In 1978, Leonid Brezhnev charged the United 
States of playing the “Chinese card” against the Soviet Union (Leffler, 2007, p. 334). 
In the current iteration, the phrase “race card” refers to the trump card or the joker. 
Playing such a card is a metaphorical reference to the strategic use of racial insinuation 
(“Playing,” 2001). The term often, though not always, is associated with the use of political 
“code words,” camouflaging “outright expression of racism,” and thus protecting the user 
from “immediate social—and political—ostracism” (Taft, 1968, as quoted in Safire, 1993, 
p. 133). 
The race card is not a single phenomenon. The Clinton and Ferraro cases represent dif-
ferent paradigms. Each paradigm presents its own challenges to the standards of reasona-
ble discourse. We argue that when the nature of these race cards is satisfactorily 
understood, citizens’ vulnerability to their strategic use becomes obvious. Also, such an 
exploration makes plain that the traditional rhetorical defenses, including tests of evidence 
and lists of fallacies, may provide in some cases adequate protection and in others no de-
fense at all. In a battle where texts, intentions, and contexts are nearly always in dispute, 
new weapons and tactics are often necessary. 
In what follows, we take on four tasks. First, we explain the present literature on the 
race card. Second, we unpack the complicated pattern of charge and countercharge in the 
Clinton and Ferraro cases. Third, we offer an account of these cases as argumentative ut-
terances rather than as persuasive strategies. Finally, we explore the avenues for combat-
ing these subtle and wily forms of racist discourse. 
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Conventional Accounts: Willie Horton and O. J. Simpson 
 
Scholars have largely built their understanding of the “race card” around two paradig-
matic examples: the Republican Party’s use of Willie Horton in the 1988 presidential cam-
paign, and the defense team’s attack on Mark Fuhrman and the Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD) in the 1995 O. J. Simpson murder trial. 
The analyses of the Horton and Simpson cases share an assumption. The “race card” is 
regarded as a contemporary phenomenon of the post-civil-rights era, where racism has 
become a taboo and the accusation of racism is harmful to the accused. In earlier times, 
advocates openly supported racial discrimination. George Wallace (1963), for example, 
championed, “Segregation today . . . segregation tomorrow . . . segregation forever” (¶. 14). 
Such an openly antagonistic discourse is “race baiting,” distinguishable from “playing the 
race card.” 
Yet, the Horton and Simpson examples are in many ways different. One used code lan-
guage to make its appeal; the other used explicit racial terms. One appealed to conservative 
white voters; the other appealed to black jurors. One was played by a white politician; the 
other by a black defense attorney on behalf of an African American client. One evoked 
images of white victimage; the other evoked images of black victimage. In sorting out this 
complexity, we describe the Horton and Simpson examples and explain the scholarship 
each has generated. 
 
Willie Horton 
Willie Horton appeared in September 1988. The National Security Political Action Com-
mittee (PAC) ran a campaign spot, entitled “Crime Quiz.” It featured a photograph of an 
African American male, Horton, along with a picture of Governor Michael Dukakis. The 
narrative of the ad said: “Bush supports the death penalty for first-degree murderers. 
Dukakis not only opposes the death penalty, he allowed first-degree murders to have 
weekend passes from prison.” The words “kidnapping,” “stabbing,” and “raping” appear 
on screen (Jamieson, 1989, p. 416). 
On October 5, the Bush campaign began airing the “Revolving Door” furlough ad. “The 
stark, black-and-white Bush ad,” Jamieson (1989) writes, “opened with bleak prison 
scenes. It then cut to a procession of convicts circling through a revolving gate and march-
ing toward the nation’s living rooms” (p. 416). Although the black convict Willie Horton 
does not appear, the public could draw the racial inference. “Exposed to Horton’s face for 
weeks by the saturation-level PAC campaign,” Jamieson (1989) argues that the “viewers 
analogized the convicts to Willie Horton” (p. 417). 
After more than two weeks of public exposure to the “Revolving Door” ad, conservative 
PACs began running spots featuring the victims of Horton’s crimes. One ad featured a 
man whose wife had been raped (Jamieson, 1989, p. 417). Mailings, fliers, and campaign 
speeches reinforced the narrative. The chair of the Maryland Republican Party, for in-
stance, sent a fund-raising letter that identified the “Dukakis/Willie Horton Team.” “You, 
your spouse, your children and your friends,” the ad read, “can have a visit from someone 
like Willie Horton if Mike Dukakis becomes president” (p. 417). 
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Using Willie Horton as the model, Tali Mendelberg’s (2001) work identifies the follow-
ing characteristics of the race card: (a) The race card is a conservative campaign strategy to 
appeal to white voters; (b) Formulated after the successes of the civil rights movement, the 
race card may be understood as part of a racial backlash; (c) This strategy assumes an egali-
tarian social norm, where white voters “want to avoid not only the public perception that 
they are racist, but also thinking of themselves as racists” (p. 7); (d) As a result, racial ap-
peals must be implicit to be effective. Implicit racial appeals “convey the same message as 
explicit racial appeals, but they replace the racial nouns and adjectives with more oblique 
references to race” (p. 9); (e) The implicit appeals work because they initiate “racial prim-
ing”; (f) Visual images are “powerful cues” and they can evoke “racial resentments, fears, 
and stereotypes” without “verbal mention of race” (pp. 9–10); and (g) If implicit racial ap-
peals are made explicit, they lose their persuasive power. 
 
O. J. Simpson 
In 1995, a former black football player, O. J. Simpson, went on trial for the gruesome slay-
ing of two white victims, his ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and her friend, Ronald Gold-
man. Simpson “‘was the most famous person in U.S. history to be put on trial for murder” 
(Williams, 2001, p. 269). The trial was the longest ever held in California, lasting more than 
8 months. The televised proceeding became the most watched trial in U.S. history 
(McConville, 1995) and, on October 3, 1995, more than 150 million viewers tuned in for the 
reading of the “not guilty” verdict (Holloway, 2005). 
 
Race Card 1 
Prominent voices accused the defense team, led by African American attorney Johnnie 
Cochran, of playing the “race card” (Higginbotham, François, & Yueh, 1997, pp. 34–35). 
The cross-examination of a white homicide detective, Mark Fuhrman, was at the center of 
this accusation. Fuhrman testified that he had not used the word “nigger” in the past 10 
years (Higginbotham et al., 1997, p. 31). But a few months later on August 29, the defense 
played audiotapes and read from transcripts, obtained from screenwriter Laura McKinny, 
of Fuhrman using the “n-word” more than 40 times. 
The defense argued that Fuhrman played a central role in the investigation. He had 
uncovered key evidence, most notably the “bloody glove” from Simpson’s Brentwood es-
tate. In Johnnie Cochran’s closing argument to the jury that included nine African Ameri-
cans, Fuhrman became a central figure in the supposed framing of the defendant 
(“Defense,” 1995). Post-trial opinion surveys revealed an enormous divide between blacks 
and whites over their judgment of the verdict (Brigham & Wasserman, 1999). 
In objecting to the admission of the Fuhrman audiotape, prosecutor Christopher Darden 
argued, “If you allow Mr. Cochran to use this word [“nigger”] and play this race card . . . 
the entire complexion of the case changes. It’s a race case then. It’s white versus black” 
(Bugliosi, 1996, p. 66). On the evening after the verdict was announced, Robert Shapiro, a 
member of the defense team, told Barbara Walters, “Not only did we play the race card, 
we dealt it from the bottom of the deck” (Jennings, 1995, ¶. 4). “We played the race card,” 
Shapiro said on October 5 to Larry King, “that’s what has happened, we have divided the 
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blacks and the whites in an unnecessary way” (King, 1995, ¶. 119). On the same day, Afri-
can American columnist Clarence Page wrote, “Mr. Cochran played more than the race 
card. He played the whole deck” (1995, p. 25A). 
Using O. J. Simpson as a model, Linda Williams (2001) constructed an account of the 
race card: (a) Playing the race card is a melodramatic presentation of racial suffering; (b) The 
card relies on a historical memory of racial abuse, which is inscribed in an iconography of 
interracial violence as a “beaten and enslaved black man” (p. 252); (c) The race card “is in 
play whenever racial abuse is invoked to cast one racially constituted group as a victim of 
another” (p. 5); (d) “With the arrival of the black and white melodrama,” Williams claims, 
“into the intensely ritualized medium of the Anglo-American trial comes the ability to see 
what has been at stake in the American racial melodrama all along: the construction of 
moral legibilities out of deep-seated guilt” (p. 274); (e) In the O. J. Simpson case the race card 
of black victimization trumped domestic abuse; “The injury to the white woman victim was 
ultimately trumped by the seemingly greater injury to a possibly framed black man” (p. 273). 
 
Race Card 2 
A vocal group of social critics argued that the “race card” was actually played by those 
who criticized the trial tactics of the Simpson legal team. The defense, they argued, fol-
lowed recognized trial procedure and properly presented and cross-examined witnesses 
with regard to credibility. 
“The Simpson defense team,” Higginbotham et al. (1997) maintain, “had a legal and 
professional obligation to introduce to the jury this very substantial and damning evidence 
of Mr. Fuhrman’s lack of credibility” (p. 40). The Fuhrman testimony was relevant in two 
respects. First, modern law holds to a standard based on falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus—
“he who speaks falsely on one point will speak falsely upon all” (p. 39). So, the previous 
lies about using the “n-word” were relevant in testing Fuhrman’s credibility on other ma-
terial parts of his testimony. Second, racial prejudice is a legally recognized source of bias. 
The Federal Appellate Court held that “prejudice toward a group of which the defendant 
is a part may be a source of partiality against the defendant” (U.S. v. Kartman, 1969, p. 897). 
They argued that O. J. Simpson’s acquittal became an opportunity for whites to express 
their anger at black preferences. “In America,” Higginbotham et al. (1997) write, “the ‘race 
card’ is usually played as part of a zero-sum game in which any gain by African Ameri-
cans—real or imagined—is considered to be a loss for whites” (p. 33). Thus, whites con-
structed the Simpson not-guilty verdict as a victory for blacks, even though it 
demonstrably was not. “Mr. Simpson’s acquittal,” they write, “did not and will not redress 
the discriminatory treatment many African Americans continue to face in the criminal jus-
tice system” (p. 33). 
Andy Rooney (1995) of 60 Minutes declared, “The acquittal was the worst thing that’s 
happened to race relations in 40 years” (¶. 7). Marshall Wittmann (1995) of the Heritage 
Foundation observed, “What we’re seeing now is thirty years of moving from a colorblind 
society to a balkanized society” (p. 36). William Bennett (1995) used the occasion of the 
Simpson verdict to renew objections against affirmative action: “We have had thirty years 
of affirmative action. We have been thinking of race, we have been counting by race, and 
now we are shocked to find a jury judges by race” (¶. 84). The conservative author Dinesh 
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D’Souza on CNN joined the argument: ‘‘I think a positive thing to come out of the verdict 
is for whites and for all Americans to ask themselves, do we want race to be embedded in 
our laws, our policy, our voting, our hiring, our promotion of government contracts; or 
should we begin to de-racialize our society?’’ (Harris, 1995, ¶. 11). Conservative columnist 
George Will (1995) wrote, “It is not surprising that the jurors had no pangs of conscience 
about regarding Simpson as a member of a group—and not seeing his victims at all.” He 
continued, “People who think ‘race-conscious remedies’ for this or that can be benign are 
partly to blame” (p. A14). 
Linda Williams (2001) understands this reaction as a “form of moralizing revenge” 
(what Nietzsche termed “ressentiment”; p. 290). “Affronted by the advantages granted 
Simpson as a person of color by a jury sensitive to past injustices toward a person of color,” 
Williams observed a “peculiar instance of an advantaged racial majority finding it possible 
to perceive themselves as if they were the aggrieved minority” (p. 290). Kimberlé Cren-
shaw (1997) regards Simpson as “a new symbol of a reconfigured vision of racism” (p. 97). 
Relying on the work of Higginbotham et al. (1997) and Williams (2001), the second 
Simpson race card has the following characteristics: (a) the race card is played against the 
backdrop of an ideal colorblind society; (b) the race card is played in a zero-sum game, 
where any win for one racial group is a loss for the other; (c) the race card is played through 
the melodramatic performance of majority-group victimage; policies to alleviate racial dis-
crimination are portrayed as victimizing majority group members; and (d) images of minority-
group preferences and majority-group victimage are presented in an ahistorical context. 
 
Comparisons 
In Table 1, we lay out the appeal, speaker, audience, grievance, and purpose of the Horton 
and Simpson race cards. The first Simpson race card (OJ1) differs from the others. It was 
uttered explicitly by an African American speaker, addressed to a predominantly black 
jury and focused on African American suffering. The Horton and second Simpson (OJ2) 
race cards are quite similar, except that Horton was implicit and Simpson explicit.  
 
Table 1. Rhetorical Comparison of Willie Horton and O. J. Simpson Race Cards 
 Appeal Speaker Audience Grievance Purpose 
Horton Implicit Republican 
Party 
White 
conservatives 
Black crime Campaign 
strategy 
OJ 1 Explicit Black attorney Black jurors White racism Trial strategy 
OJ 2 Explicit Conservative 
opinion-leaders 
White 
conservatives 
Black 
preferences 
Ideological 
strategy 
 
Playing the Race Card in 2008: Bill Clinton and Geraldine Ferraro 
 
In what follows, we describe the Clinton and Ferraro incidents. In each case, two separate 
accusations of playing the race card are advanced—four in all. 
In the first instance, Bill Clinton’s likening of Obama’s possible victory in South Carolina 
to that of Jesse Jackson’s started the controversy. Clinton’s comments dominated the news. 
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Later that day, George Stephanopoulos predicted the Clintons would say that South 
Carolina “is home turf for Barack Obama. They’ll also say more quietly that now he’s be-
come the black candidate” (Muir, 2008b, ¶. 14). The next day on Fox News Sunday, Mara 
Liasson said, “I think the Clintons have been trying to make the point that no, he’s just like 
Jesse Jackson . . . he’s a black candidate, not a candidate who happens to be black” (C. 
Wallace, 2008, ¶. 50). Juan Williams, on the same broadcast, offered, “It is an outrage. . . . 
[I]t’s racial code language” (C. Wallace, 2008, ¶. 66). Also on Sunday, ABC’s David Wright 
negatively interpreted Clinton’s remarks: “Even before the polls had closed, Bill Clinton 
was already dismissing the notion of an Obama victory” (Weir, 2008, ¶. 22). 
NBC’s Meet the Press devoted most of its program to Clinton’s comments. Contributor 
Chuck Todd said, “[T]here’s been all this talk about whether this primary had become ra-
cialized and somehow Barack Obama was getting pigeon-holed and he was going to be 
the black candidate for president rather than a candidate for president who happens to be 
black” (Russert, 2008, ¶. 5). The program’s host, Tim Russert, added, “Congressman Cly-
burn (D-SC) had said earlier in the day that Bill Clinton had been using, in effect, code 
words that really made black Americans nervous.” He continued, “Ron Walters, a profes-
sor at University of Maryland, made this observation the other day on NPR, . . . ‘The only 
way that Obama is going to be elected is to try to neutralize race. . . . The objective of the 
Clinton campaign is to make him blacker’” (Russert, 2008, ¶¶. 12–14). 
On Monday morning, CBS featured “diversity” expert Joe Watson. He argued, “Jesse 
Jackson causes a visceral reaction in many portions of our population. Many folks within 
the campaign, I imagine, would hope that it would be negative” (Smith, 2008, ¶. 18). In the 
evening, Fox’s Bill O’Reilly spoke with former House Speaker Newt Gingrich about Clin-
ton’s comments. Gingrich said that the former president had “been . . . overtly engaged in 
race baiting. . . . This was a clear effort on the part of the Clintons to . . . define Senator 
Obama as a black candidate, rather than as a senator who happens to be black” (O’Reilly, 
2008, ¶¶. 30, 33). Later that evening, ABC’s Nightline juxtaposed Clinton’s South Carolina 
comments with Senator Edward Kennedy’s endorsement of Obama. The producers se-
lected these words to air from Kennedy’s statement: “I am convinced we can reach our 
goals only if we replace the politics of fear with the politics of hope and only if we have 
the courage to choose change” (Moran, 2008, ¶. 49). 
On Sunday, January 27, Senator Obama appeared on ABC’s This Week with George Steph-
anopoulos. Stephanopoulos spent the first half of the interview questioning Obama about 
Bill Clinton’s Jesse Jackson remarks. Senator Obama made no explicit charges regarding 
Clinton playing the “race card.” Instead, he said, there is “no doubt that [Jackson] set a 
precedent for African Americans running for office. . . . But . . . that was 20 years ago.” He 
continued, “I think people want change. I think they want to get beyond some of the racial 
politics that has been so dominant in the past.” He observed, “I think that [Bill Clinton’s] 
frame of reference, was the Jesse Jackson races. That’s when . . . he was active and involved 
in watching what was going to take place in South Carolina.” Later he remarked, “As long 
as were focused on those issues [affordable health care and college, addressing the fore-
closure crisis], we thought that would transcend the sort of racial divisions we have seen 
in the past.” He did say quite specifically that he did not think the Clintons were “trying 
to demonize me” (Stephanopoulos, 2008, ¶¶. 9–17). 
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Bill Clinton responded to the race card charges with a counterattack. On March 17, he 
granted an interview to ABC’s Robin Roberts (2008). He told her, “They [surrogates] made 
up a race story out of that. There was no disrespect to Senator Obama in that. . . . They 
thought they could hurt me with that, and so they put a bizarre spin on it, and it worked 
for a while” (¶. 22). 
On the same day, Clinton spoke to Fox News host Greta Van Susteren (2008). “And I 
think,” he told her, “for African-Americans who have been voting for decades for white 
candidates, they think they have an African-American candidate with a legitimate chance 
to be nominated and elected. There is a pull there to identify with him. It’s not racially 
tinged to observe that fact or those facts” (¶. 72). 
Again on March 17, Clinton spoke to CNN’s Sean Callebs (2008): “What happened 
there,” he said, “is a total myth and a mugging.” “Charlie Rangel, the most important Af-
rican-American today,” he continued, “. . . said in unequivocal terms . . . that no one in our 
campaign played any race cards; that we had some played against us, but we didn’t play 
any” (¶¶. 107, 108). 
In April, Bill Clinton, in a Philadelphia radio interview, said, “I think that they played 
the race card on me. We now know, from memos from the campaign and everything, that 
they planned to do it [all] along” (Phillips, 2008, p. A18). 
Obama was asked about Bill Clinton’s claim that the Obama campaign had played the 
“race card.” “So former President Clinton dismissed my victory in South Carolina as being 
similar to Jesse Jackson, and he is suggesting that somehow I had something to do with 
it?” He continued, “O.K., well, you better ask him about what he meant by that. I have no 
idea what he meant” (Phillips, 2008, p. A18). 
In Table 2, we lay out the appeal, speaker, audience, grievance, and purpose of the two 
Clinton race cards, labeled BC1 and BC2. The first differs from the second in three respects: 
(a) the BC1 appeal is implicit, BC2 explicit; (b) The audience for BC1 is white primary vot-
ers; the audience for BC2 is all primary voters, including African Americans; and (c) the 
grievance in BC1 is the black bloc voting for Obama that carried South Carolina; the griev-
ance in BC2 is the attempt to delegitimize Obama as just a black candidate. 
 
Table 2. Rhetorical Comparison of Bill Clinton Race Cards 
 Appeal Speaker Audience Grievance Purpose 
BC 1 Implicit Bill Clinton White voters 
and super- 
delegates 
African Ameri-
can bloc voting 
Campaign 
strategy 
BC 2 Explicit Obama 
surrogates 
Media, primary 
voters, and 
super-delegates 
Delegitimize as 
black candidate 
Campaign 
strategy 
 
Geraldine Ferraro 
On Friday, March 7, 2008, Ferraro’s interview with the Daily Breeze sparked controversy. 
She claimed that Obama would not be “in this present position” if he were a “white man” 
or a “woman (of any color)” (Farber, 2008, p. 6D). 
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Obama dismissed her comments as “divisive” (Bazinet, 2008, p. 13) and “patently ab-
surd” (“Obama camp,” 2008, p. A8). Obama adviser Susan Rice found them “outrageous 
and offensive” (“Obama camp,” p. A8). Campaign spokesman Bill Burton attacked Senator 
Clinton for her “refusal to denounce or reject Ms. Ferraro,” and said, “She has once again 
proven that her campaign gets to live by its own rules and its own double standard” 
(“Obama camp,” p. A8). Chief strategist David Axelrod argued that Ferraro was trying to 
“diminish Senator Obama’s candidacy because of his race” (Kornblut & Slevin, 2008, p. 
A1). The next day on NBC, Obama characterized Ferraro’s comments as part of a “slice-
and-dice politics that’s about race and about gender” (Saul, 2008, p. 18). 
Ferraro’s comments were widely covered. On March 11, Keith Olbermann and Tim 
Russert discussed the controversy. Russert claimed these comments jeopardized black 
support for Hillary Clinton (Olbermann, 2008). Later that evening, Dan Abrams (2008) 
went on the air and interpreted the strong African American vote for Obama in the Mis-
sissippi primary as a backlash against Clinton. On the same day, conservative commenta-
tor Tucker Carlson (2008) defended Ferraro. “I actually think,” he said, “that a lot of what 
Geraldine Ferraro says may be true. It’s a net plus that Obama is black” (¶. 191). The next 
day, Ferraro was the lead topic on Fox Special Report with Brit Hume. One contributor, Mor-
ton Kondracke, interpreted Ferraro’s remark very negatively. “But that’s not all he’s got 
going for him,” he argued, “and what she said was that he would not be in this position 
except for the fact that he’s black” (Hume, 2008, ¶. 15). 
In the wake of the firestorm Hillary Clinton distanced herself from Ferraro. Ferraro re-
signed from the campaign (“Obama camp,” 2008; Saul, 2008). Ferraro, however, did not go 
quietly. She gave interviews defending her remarks and charging the Obama campaign 
with playing the race card. 
On March 11, Ferraro appeared on Fox News. “What I find offensive,” she said, “is that 
every time somebody says something about the campaign, you’re accused of being racist” 
(McCallum, 2008, ¶. 138). On March 12, Diane Sawyer (2008) interviewed Ferraro. Ferraro 
claimed her “comments have been taken so out of context and been spun by the Obama 
campaign as racist” (¶. 9). She argued that she was “celebrating the fact that the black 
community in this country has come out with a pride in a historic candidacy” (¶. 34). On 
the same morning, Ferraro appeared on CBS. “I’m outraged,” she charged, “that Axelrod 
. . . his campaign manager, has chose to spin this as a racist comment, he does it every time 
anybody makes a comment about race that’s white” (Mitchell, 2008, ¶. 34). On the NBC 
Evening News, Ann Curry (2008, March 12) asked Ferraro directly: “You’re saying they’re 
playing the race card, not the Hillary campaign.” “Absolutely,” Ferraro answered (¶. 32, 
33). 
Obama replied to the charges that the campaign had called Ferraro a “racist.” “I would 
defy anybody,” Obama said, “to look through the record over the last year and a half, or 
the last year and couple months, and find one instance in which I have said some criticism 
is racially based” (Purnick, 2008, p. A16). 
In Table 3, we display the features of the two Ferraro race cards (GF1 and GF2). Each is 
explicit, for they both use racial terms, and both may be understood as a campaign strat-
egy, no matter how misguided. The distinction is in the grievance. Ferraro’s original com-
ments (GF1) were interpreted as arguing that Obama is the leading Democratic candidate 
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because he is black and, therefore, afforded some racial preference. In the second race card 
(GF2), the Obama campaign describes itself as the victim of white/female resentment. 
 
Table 3. Rhetorical Comparison of Geraldine Ferraro Race Cards 
 Appeal Speaker Audience Grievance Purpose 
GF 1 Explicit Geraldine 
Ferraro 
White voters 
and super- 
delegates 
Racial 
preferences 
Campaign 
strategy 
GF 2 Explicit Obama 
campaign 
(David Axelrod) 
Media, primary 
voters, and 
super-delegates 
White/female 
resentment 
Campaign 
strategy 
 
Reason and the Race Card 
 
Scholars have understood the race card as a persuasive strategy. We set this strategic focus 
aside and inquire whether the Clinton and Ferraro utterances are a species of argumenta-
tion. For, if they are, then traditional standards of criticism are available. If they are not, 
then we must locate new angles of evaluation. “To argue” is an illocutionary act defined 
as a reason-giving utterance (Ehninger, 1980). Uttering a claim and its supporting reasons 
constitutes arguing. It is wholly irrelevant, as a matter of definition, whether or not the 
argument is convincing, for we may be said to argue even if our arguments have no dis-
cernible effect. The sentence “I argued with her for an hour and yet was unable to change 
her mind” is perfectly intelligible. 
“To persuade” is a perlocutionary act defined in terms of an effect. To persuade is not 
limited, as a matter of definition, by any particular means. The sentence “I persuaded him 
to alter the accounting procedures in the annual report, when I threatened to fire him” is 
meaningful. Although we might consider threats an ethically defective form of persuasion, 
this sentence uses the verb “to persuade” in a literal sense. However, to say “I persuaded 
her to give me $10, but she would not give it to me” is nonsense because “persuaded” just 
means to have the desired effect. 
Are the various race-card cases we have examined made up of argumentative utter-
ances? The answer is mixed. 
In the Willie Horton case, Mendelberg (2001) defines the race card as a specific effect 
achieved by a particular means. The playing of the race card instigates racial priming and 
calls forth racial stereotypes—the effect. Deploying code words and images plays the 
card—the means. The code words work because they have a long history in American race 
relations. Black-male-on-white-female crime, especially “rape,” is just such a code. They 
are code because they are racist conventions. They have appeared frequently in racist texts 
and are, thus, recognizable at some level, but certainly by the informed critic. The ghost of 
Emmett Till hovers over the Horton discourses. 
We have encountered a definitional trap. Does the act of deploying conventionally un-
derstood racial code words or images constitute playing the race card? Or, is the card only 
played when the act is completed in a desired effect? We might speak of race card “at-
tempts.” Certainly, such attempts deserve criticism apart from the demonstrated evidence 
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of impact. To return to the original metaphor, a card is played whether or not it wins the 
trick. 
Setting the illocutionary standard aside, does Horton meet the “reason-giving” crite-
rion? We think the answer is certainly no. “Arguing,” Ehninger (1980) observes, is “more 
than a reason implying discourse; it is reason-giving discourse” (p. 93). The only explicit 
reason-claim in Horton drew an inference between the Massachusetts prison furlough pro-
gram and Governor Dukakis’s record on crime. The racial connotation is offered neither as 
reason nor claim. After all, speakers use code just so they can avoid uttering racial argu-
ments. 
In the O. J. Simpson case, the melodramatic presentation of racial suffering by one group 
at the hands of another constitutes the race card. In both OJ1 and OJ2, the act of presenta-
tion, apart from effect, played the card. The racial context was understood because the 
appeals were explicit. Here, too, the melodramatic presentations are familiar. Williams 
(2001) illustrates black victimization images going back to Uncle Tom’s Cabin. From Recon-
struction to Bakke, the terms of white resentment over black preferences are familiar. In 
OJ1 and OJ2, the race-card utterances are illocutionary. 
Do the Simpson cases meet the “reason-giving” standard? Playing the race card presents 
racial suffering and calls forth cultural memories. These memories are then used as justifi-
cations. In OJ1, they give reason for the jury’s suspicion of the LAPD. In OJ2, the specter 
of black preference underwrites the suspicion that color-blind justice was not rendered in 
the Simpson case. Unlike Horton, here the racial reasoning is explicit. 
How may we evaluate the Clinton and Ferraro race cards? Although they resemble the 
Horton and Simpson paradigms, they add vexing complications. 
BC1 resembles Horton. Clinton could be said to have played the race card if his remarks 
instigated racial priming and called forth racial stereotypes associated with “Jesse Jack-
son.” Clinton does not make an argument. He is involved in the illocutionary acts of stating 
(Jackson won in ’84 and ’88) and complimenting (Jackson and Obama ran good campaigns) 
not reason giving. Even if we might find in Clinton’s comments some analogy, the com-
parison is between winning and good campaigns. Any racial claim, buried in code lan-
guage, falls short of our arguing standard. 
We said of Horton that just the utterance of code words might be said to constitute play-
ing the race card. Perhaps, the act of “attempting” may rightly be regarded as illocutionary. 
If Clinton deployed code, even if unsuccessfully, this is worthy of criticism. Although Clin-
ton was accused of using “code” in South Carolina, his words were hardly conventional. 
They lacked the prior textual history associated with code. If this was code, then it follows 
Burke’s ironic formula, “what goes forth as A returns as non-A” (1969, p. 517). Clinton’s 
praise of the Jackson and Obama campaigns returns as code for diminishing them as 
“black” candidates. 
Despite their talk of code, Clinton’s accusers had to muster a case based on intention 
rather than convention. They imagined the meaning and effect that Clinton intended. 
Whatever else it was, praising Jesse Jackson’s South Carolina primary campaigns was not 
a historically racist allusion. Even if the name “Jesse Jackson” referred to a candidate who 
won with a majority black vote, the notion that a black candidate is diminished by such a 
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vote hardly constitutes conventional code. None of the interpreters of the Clinton remarks 
supported their interpretations with previous examples of the “Jackson” code. 
BC2 and GF1–2 resemble the Simpson models. The speakers explicitly claim to have 
suffered at the hands of another racial group. They articulate their grievances in reason-
giving form. The two countercharges, BC2 and GF2, are startling clear. These utterances 
specify who played the race card and what was said that constituted playing the card. 
Regardless of the soundness of these claims, they are unambiguous examples of argu-
ments. 
 
Defeating the Race Card 
 
The race card carries with it the fear that prejudice will subvert reason and, thus, short 
circuit criticism. In this essay, we have examined seven putative instances of playing the 
race card (Horton, OJ1, OJ2, BC1, BC2, GF1, and GF2). Each is susceptible to at least one of 
these critical inquiries: 
1. Did the speaker employ conventional racist code? 
2. Was race introduced appropriately or inappropriately into the argument? 
3. Was the claim true or false? 
4. Is the claim supportable by trustworthy evidence? 
5. Is the reasoning defensible? 
 
The Horton and first Clinton (BC1) cases can be criticized by posing the first question. 
Goldberg (1993) discusses such a standpoint as an “antiracist” standard (p. 220). “We need 
clear criteria,” he writes, “for identifying individual responsibility” for the use of “racist 
expression” that is not tied “too restrictively to individual intentionality” (p. 97). The way 
to do this is by establishing a criterion that the users of certain language or images are 
presumed to know or should have known the racist history of those words or images. 
“Persons may also be racist,” Goldberg maintains, “where their expressions fit a historical 
legacy or where the effects exhibit a pattern of racialized exclusion, and these are effects 
the persons should reasonably be clear about or it is a historical legacy to which they 
should reasonably be sensitive.” He continues, “The tendency to hold agents accountable 
in these cases becomes more acceptable the more reasonable it is to insist that they should 
have known better” (p. 98). 
The critic of the Horton case may answer “yes” to question one. The same critic, when 
exploring BC1, must answer “no.” Clinton does not use terms that have a “historical leg-
acy” of “racialized exclusion.” 
The evaluation of the first Simpson case (OJ1) turns on the answer to question two. Hig-
ginbotham et al. (1997) advance an argument over “appropriate” legal defense. They offer 
credible evidence and follow standard forms of reasoning. 
The second Simpson (OJ2) and the first Ferraro (GF1) cases are analyzable, in one way 
or another, by all five standards. (a) Raising the specter of black privilege has a historical 
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legacy of racial exclusion. (b) One may reasonably ask whether the claims were appropri-
ate given the circumstances. Each was arguably an unnecessary distraction from the salient 
issues at hand. (c) OJ2 and GF1 were contested over the criterion of truth or falsity. Critics 
argued that the historical record could not support any black-privilege claim. (d) Evidence 
concerning black privilege is available. (e) The OJ2 and GF1 claims exemplified reasoning 
from cause and sign. 
The second Clinton (BC2) and second Ferraro (GF2) cases can be investigated by asking 
questions two through five. Certainly, it is a straightforward procedure to determine if the 
speakers have been accused of playing the race card (questions 3, 4, and 5). The matter 
turned on question two. Was the accusation inappropriate? This turns on a prior evalua-
tion of BC1 and GF1. In our view, Clinton has a much stronger case than Ferraro. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Clinton and Ferraro remarks represent the complex of race cards. No single standpoint 
for assessment works for all the cards. Yet, if scholars patiently explore the rhetorical var-
iations, they will discover productive angles of criticism. Then, we can trump the race card. 
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